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Border of Water, Border of Law:
Río Bravo/Rio Grande Boundary
Adjudications Since 1884
PETER L. REICH†

I. INTRODUCTION
This essay traces how the Mexico-U.S. water boundary, which
began as a geographic feature, ended as a legal doctrine. While many
scholars have studied various aspects of the border, including its
history, economics, politics, and sociology, few have examined its
most obvious topographical fact: the Río Bravo/Rio Grande.1 That
lacuna may stem from the fact the physical river and the political
boundary are not always the same, so riverine demarcation has been a
complicated process which has defined the border in conjunction with
its other characteristics. Demonstrating the difficulties of the
delineation, this project begins an analysis of the binational decisions
by which, for over a century, the International Boundary Commission
© 2018 Peter L. Reich
† B.A., M.A., Ph.D., UCLA; J.D., UC Berkeley. Peter Reich is Lecturer in Law, UCLA
School of Law. The author would like to thank the editors of the Maryland Journal of
International Law for organizing the Fall 2017 Symposium, The United States-Mexico
Relationship in International Law and Politics, and the conference participants for their
insightful comments on this paper.
1. See PETER L. REICH, THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES-MEXICO BORDER: A CASEBOOK
3–9 (2017) (integrating theoretical, social scientific, and regional research on the border); see
also PAUL GANSTER & DAVID LOREY, THE U.S.-MEXICAN BORDER INTO THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY (2008); THE U.S.-MEXICO TRANSBORDER REGION: CULTURAL DYNAMICS AND
HISTORICAL INTERACTION (Carlos G. Vélez-Ibañez & Josiah Heyman eds., 2017) (providing
non-legal overviews of border issues); Donald W. Peters, The Rio Grande Boundary Dispute
in American Diplomacy, 54 SW. HIST. Q. 412 (1951) (describing negotiations over the river
boundary through 1950); Robert J. McCarthy, Executive Authority, Adaptive Treaty
Interpretation, and the International Boundary and Water Commission, U.S.-Mexico, 14 U.
DENV. WATER L. REV. 197 (2011) (detailing the statutory authority for, and administrative
problems of, river boundary management).
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(IBC) and its post-1944 successor, the International Boundary and
Water Commission (IBWC), have allocated ownership of bancos
(sandbar islands).2
First, the article sets up a theoretical construct framing rivers as
contestation sites whereby analysis of a series of cases reveals
underlying structural patterns in dispute resolution. Next, it discusses
the specific geographical and social context of an uncontrollable river
which has challenged both the assessments of experts and the needs of
local populations. The project continues with a description of the
binational legal framework for which Roman law became a common
language. The core of the essay then evaluates banco adjudication in
practice, based on Boundary Commission reports and “minutes”
(agreements on specific controversies).3 Disputes were settled
amicably, with one notable exception: the Chamizal arbitration
regarding a banco lying between Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, and El
Paso, Texas. Finally, the essay explains why the binational decision
to channelize some of the river with concrete may have prevented
unpredictable physical changes, but has not eliminated contestation, as
a recent cross-border shooting case demonstrates.
II. THEORETICAL CONSTRUCT
Varying theories generated by the problematic legal situation of
rivers, and the application of structuralism to international law, all
provide valuable lenses through which to view Río Bravo/Rio Grande
boundary adjudications. Referring to European imperialism in Africa
and the New World, historian Lauren Benton identifies rivers as
“treacherous places” of colonial contestation between maritime and
upcountry communities.4 Conquerors attempting to penetrate the
interior by river confronted not only harrowing rapids but powerful
rivals, both foreign and local, who did not acknowledge any particular
country’s legal “rights” to possession and occupation.5 Authorities’
difficulties in imposing control on riverine areas have also occurred in
2. The author is currently preparing an extended study of the banco adjudications in the
context of international legal history.
3. COMISIÓN INTERNACIONAL DE LíMITES ENTRE MEXICO Y LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS,
SECCION MEXICANA, MONUMENTACIÓN DE BANCOS EN EL RíO BRAVO DEL NORTE (O RIO
GRANDE) EJECUTADA CONFORME A LA CONVENCIÓN DE BANCOS DEL 20 DE MARZO DE 1905,
SEGUNDA SERIE, BANCOS NÚMEROS 59 A 89, AÑOS DE 1910–12 (1912);
www.ibwc.state.gov/Files/Minutes.
4. See LAUREN BENTON, A SEARCH FOR SOVEREIGNTY: LAW AND GEOGRAPHY IN
EUROPEAN EMPIRES, 1400–1900, at 41, 103 (2010).
5. Id.
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non-colonial contexts, such as that of the Seine in revolutionary Paris,
where official attempts to suppress banditry and gambling were
regularly eluded, and water access disputes between millers and other
users resisted governmental intervention.6 It is easy to see how
administrative problems could only be magnified when rivers were
declared to be hard boundaries between nations but still remained
hotbeds of contention.
The model of legal structuralism illuminates how endemic
riverine conflicts have been resolved. According to this school of
thought, distinctive rhetorical patterns and strategies characterize
particular doctrines.7 In other words, the law is a language system in
which legal source materials (court decisions, professional writings)
reveal similarities beneath the surface of what may at first appear to be
opposing positions.8 For example, the European imperial powers
employed Roman legal concepts such as terra nullius (land without an
owner) to justify their claims against competitors from the West, who
also accepted these identical terms of discourse.9 As will be seen, the
management of the geographically and socio-politically problematic
banco disputes can also be understood as an application of the
structuralist approach.
III. GEOGRAPHICAL AND SOCIETAL CONTEXT
Before demonstrating how the Boundary Commission employed
an international legal language facilitating conflict reduction, a
description of the specific topography and governmental process in the
border region will clarify why territorial controversies took place. The
Río Bravo/Rio Grande at times meanders slowly, and at others shifts
rapidly, depending upon the sub humid or arid characteristics of the
landscape through which it flows.10 Loops in the river were constantly
being cut off, creating new bancos on one side or the other.11 After the
1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo designated the riverline as the
international boundary, these isolated parcels became the subjects of
sovereignty disputes, and residents were forced either to abandon them
6. RICHARD COBB, PARIS AND ITS PROVINCES, 1792–1802, at 57–86 (1975).
7. DAVID KENNEDY, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STRUCTURES 7, 289 (1987).
8. Justin Desautels-Stein, International Legal Structuralism, 8 INT’L THEORY 201, 208,
211 (2016).
9. BENTON, supra note 4, at 59.
10. JERRY E. MUELLER, RESTLESS RIVER: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE BEHAVIOR OF
THE RIO GRANDE 123–24 (1974).
11. JOHN W. HOUSE, FRONTIER ON THE RIO GRANDE: A POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF
DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL DEPRIVATION 37–39 (1982).
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or to suffer uncertain status.12 The bancos became refuges for bandits
and smugglers, making the determination of their nationality even
more urgent for authorities of both nations.13
FIGURE 1: CONTEMPORARY
SHOWING HOW THE RIO GRANDE’S

MAP OF THE PANALES BANCO,
CHANGING COURSE ISOLATED THE
PARCEL ON A DIFFERENT SIDE OF THE RIVER.14

12. Id. at 39; see Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement with the Republic
of Mexico, art. 5, Feb. 2, 1848, 9 STAT. 922 (designating the Río Bravo/Rio Grande as the
boundary).
13. See HOUSE, supra note 11.
14. IBWC
Minute
No.
239
(Oct.
16,
1970),
available
at
https://www.ibwc.gov/Minutes/Min.239pdf.
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In addition to the natural geography of the region, the professional
collaboration between Mexican and U.S. officials charged with
administering the boundary contributed to the context of the banco
adjudications. For example, in the late nineteenth century, consuls and
local bureaucrats in the borderlands cooperated to interdict crossborder criminal activity and to extradite prisoners over whom one of
the countries preferred to exert jurisdiction.15
Similarly, the
willingness of both governments to enforce the boundary itself ended
centuries of violence between Mexican and regional Native American
communities by preventing the latter from using the U.S. side as a
temporary haven.16
This traditional partnership informed the
adjudications at multiple levels, influencing the legal and hydrological
models that lawyers and engineers used to settle disputes.17
IV. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The diplomats and lawyers addressing Mexico-U.S. water
boundary questions found a unifying discourse in the longstanding
legal doctrines of accretion and avulsion. According to classical
Roman law, alluvial additions, or accretion (also called alluvion),
altered a riverine boundary, while rapid shifts in the watercourse, or
avulsion, did not.18 Both the civil law and common law traditions
incorporated these concepts, which appear in mid-nineteenth-century
Mexican and U.S. treatises well prior to the beginning of the banco
adjudications.19
This doctrinal framework for banco adjudication was
complemented by a series of binational treaties and conventions. In
1848, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo ending the Mexican-U.S. War
delineated the Río Bravo/Rio Grande and a short portion of the

15. DANIEL S. MARGOLIES, SPACES OF LAW IN AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS:
EXTRADITION AND EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN THE BORDERLANDS AND BEYOND, 1877–1898, at
27–28, 333 (2011).
16. LANCE R. BLYTH, CHIRICAHUA AND JANOS: COMMUNITIES OF VIOLENCE IN THE
SOUTHWESTERN BORDERLANDS, 1680–1880, at 21 (2012).
17. DONALD WORSTER, AN UNSETTLED COUNTRY: CHANGING LANDSCAPES OF THE
AMERICAN WEST 36 (1994) (discussing the international scientific language employed by
nineteenth-century water engineers).
18. GAIUS, THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS 270 (William M. Gordon & Olivia F. Robinson
trans., 1988); FRITZ SCHULZ, CLASSICAL ROMAN LAW 363 (reprint 1992) (1951).
19. JUAN SALA, SALA MEXICANO 62–63 (1845); JOSEPH K. ANGELL, LAW OF
WATERCOURSES 53–57, 60–61 (5th ed. 1854); see also JOAQUÍN ESCRICHE, DICCIONARIO
RAZONADO DE LEGISLACIÓN Y JURISPRUDENCIA 149, 335–36 (1852) (standard Spanish legal
dictionary with entries for aluvión and avulsión).
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Colorado River as the international river boundary. 20 U.S. Attorney
General Caleb Cushing, in an 1856 official opinion, considered that
the accretion and avulsion doctrines applied squarely to any disputes
over the borderline’s location, citing to civil law and common law
sources.21 Having created the International Boundary Commission
(IBC) to conduct joint surveys in 1882, the two countries signed a
convention in 1884 to maintain the riverine border as the center of the
“normal channel,” and reaffirmed the applicability of the Roman legal
principles.22 A further convention in 1905 modified the 1884
agreement by retaining only the deepest river channel as the boundary
after the formation of bancos by course changes, and “eliminated”
(allocated) land thus cut off by transferring it to the country to which
it was now attached, so long as the parcel was less than 250 hectares
(617 acres) in size or had fewer than 200 inhabitants.23 Based on this
system, the IBC began the complicated process of surveying and
assigning bancos to the respective nations.24
V. BANCO ADJUDICATION IN PRACTICE
Implementing these accords between 1906 and 1941, the IBC
eliminated 172 bancos, transferring approximately two thirds of the
land at issue to the United States and one third of it to Mexico.25 From
1941 to 1967 the proportion was reversed, with slightly over half the
acreage becoming Mexican.26 These decisions were facilitated by a
cooperative attitude on the part of both countries, and the mutually
understood language of Roman law.
The successful proceedings of the Commission were facilitated
by extensive collaboration among binational personnel: the joint
crews sent out to gather information about banco formation and the
commissioners themselves. An example of teamwork within a
Mexican-U.S. surveying unit took place during 1910-11 field
20. Treaty of Peace, supra note 12; see also HOUSE, supra note 11.
21. Arcifinious Boundaries, 7 Op. Att’y Gen. 175, 179–180 (1858).
22. Convention Between the United States of America and the United States of Mexico
Touching the International Boundary Line Where It Follows the Bed of the Rio Grande and
Rio Colorado, U.S.-Mex., arts. I, II, Nov. 12, 1884, 24 Stat. 1011. In 1944 the IBC was
renamed the International Boundary and Water Commission. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, at
211.
23. Convention Between the United States and Mexico for the Elimination of the Bancos
in the Rio Grande from the Effects of Article II of the Treaty of November 12, 1884, U.S.Mex., arts I, II, Mar. 20, 1905, 35 Stat. 1863.
24. See MUELLER, supra note 10.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 40.
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operations, when a U.S. leveler made a one-half-meter mistake in
calculating the elevation between Rio Grande City and Roma, Texas,
and the error was caught and corrected without incident by his Mexican
counterpart.27 These skilled technicians were viewed as a resource by
the Commission, which regularly consulted them on the advisability of
creating bancos artificially by cutting off bends in the river.28 The IBC
also recorded testimony from local residents on the consequences of
allocating a particular banco to one side or the other, as when El Paso
County wanted to acquire land through such cutoffs, or when shifting
a banco to grant Mexican citizens water access might inconveniently
isolate a U.S. pumping plant.29 Based on such information-gathering,
the commissioners could recommend a reasoned course of action, such
as when the two governments split the cost of a fence along the
boundary running through certain bancos.30
Expert data collection by engineers and their assessment by the
Commission generally resulted in agreement as to whether a given
banco was formed by border-altering accretion or less consequential
avulsion. In the 1907 case of the Soliseñito banco near Matamoros,
Tamaulipas, the Mexican engineer argued that the land, originally in
Texas, had become part of Mexico by accretion, while his U.S.
counterpart disagreed.31 After receiving vague testimony from a local
resident, the Commission allocated the Soliseñito to the Mexican side
because “the Commissioners will always assume that … prior change
was caused by gradual erosion and deposit … unless said prior
avulsive change can be conclusively proven by reliable surveys and
well qualified witnesses and the usual evidence on the ground….”32
Due to the 1905 Convention’s “elimination” provision for bancos
smaller than 250 hectares, its members often agreed not to apply the
accretion/avulsion rule.33 Thus, when the Culebrón (“Never-ending
Snake”) banco of 75.2 hectares was cut from Mexico by avulsion, they
left it on the American side in 1946, while when the Panales
27. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY
COMMISSION UNITED STATES AND MEXICO, AMERICAN JOINT REPORT OF THE CONSULTING
ENGINEERS ON FIELD OPERATIONS OF 1910–11, at 16 (1913).
28. IBC
Minute
No.
44
(June
11,
1924),
available
at
https://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min44.pdf.
29. IBC
Minute
No.
43
(June
6,
1924),
available
at
https://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min43.pdf; IBC Minute No. 56 (May 4, 1925), available
at https://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min56.pdf.
30. IBC
Minute
No.
15
(Nov.
27,
1923),
available
at
https://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min15.pdf.
31. COMISIÓN, supra note 3, at 44.
32. Id. at 44–45.
33. House, supra note 11, at 38–39.
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(“Honeycombs;” see Figure 1) and Loma del Pinto bancos of 34.7 and
37.3 hectares, respectively, were similarly cut from the United States
they allocated them to Mexico in 1970.34
Yet one case, the Chamizal controversy regarding a banco
between Ciudad Juárez and El Paso, became the exception that sorely
proved the rule of binational collaboration.35 In 1895, the countries
attempted to address their dispute over whether the land had passed to
the United States through accretion or, as Mexico claimed, remained
its own because the change was avulsive.36 The matter went to
international arbitration in 1910, but the United States outright rejected
the Canadian judge’s decision to divide the land.37 At last, in 1963,
U.S. President John F. Kennedy settled the issue diplomatically,
conceding most of the banco to Mexico as a gesture of international
goodwill.38 The parties then agreed to prevent further watercourse
changes by relocating the area channel into a concrete culvert (see
Figure 2).39 While the Chamizal dispute was not formally concluded
according to the accretion and avulsion doctrines, a recent Mexican
treatise on Roman law states that avulsion was in fact the basis for the
settlement, thus contextualizing it within the shared discourse
governing the other banco adjudications.40
VI. CONCLUSION
Practical cooperation and the adoption of a common legal
language were both manifestations of the equal willingness on the part
of Mexico and the United States to overcome their riverine boundary
conflicts. In this aim, of course, the countries were not unique.
According to one study of Latin American international relations,
34. IBWC
Minute
No.
183
(Sept.
24,
1946),
available
at
https://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min183.pdf; IBWC Minute No. 239 (Oct. 16, 1970),
available at https://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min239.pdf.
35. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL (WATER) BOUNDARY
COMMISSION, UNITED STATES AND MEXICO, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF THE WATERS OF THE
RIO GRANDE 45 (1903).
36. Id.
37. SHELDON B. LISS, A CENTURY OF DISAGREEMENT: THE CHAMIZAL CONFLICT, 1864–
1964, 34–35 (1965).
38. See id.; ALAN C. LAMBORN & STEPHEN P. MUMME, STATECRAFT, DOMESTIC POLITICS,
AND FOREIGN POLICY MAKING: THE EL CHAMIZAL DISPUTE (1988) (focusing primarily on
diplomatic negotiations and policy aspects of the controversy). This author’s current study of
the banco adjudications delves more deeply into the legal arguments over El Chamizal and
their basis in Roman, Spanish, French, Mexican, and U.S. law.
39. IBWC
Minute
No.
214
(Aug.
28,
1963),
available
at
https://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min214.pdf.
40. JOSÉ DE JESÚS LEDESMA URIBE, ET AL., DERECHO ROMANO I (2015).
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nations have often resolved territorial disputes because stable borders
encourage mutually beneficial trade and regional economic
integration, and that is doubtless true elsewhere in the world.41 In the
Mexico-U.S. situation, congenial on-the-ground collaboration and the
unifying discourse of Roman law evidenced the mutual desire that the
banco adjudications yield positive results, (notwithstanding the
unusually circuitous denouement of the Chamizal conflict).
Significantly, the cases coincided with a late-nineteenth- and earlytwentieth-century business boom in the Mexico-Texas border region,
enhanced by generally cooperative international relations and
advantageous financing laws on both sides.42 In this sense the
accretion and avulsion doctrines constituted a structure which
mediated controversy and clearly contributed to a climate favoring
economic development.
This is not to say that all contestation of the boundary was ended
by the banco adjudications and the Chamizal channelization. One
recent scholar has asserted that the latter “sanitized” Mexico-U.S.
tensions which surface via graffiti on the culvert’s banks, constituting
dissent by those people unable to cross the border freely. 43 And in a
recent U.S. Supreme Court case, the family of a Mexican boy shot on
the south side of the culvert by a U.S. Border Patrol agent standing on
the other side was allowed to continue its lawsuit based on the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments, showing that keeping the Rio Grande from
changing course has hardly ended its role as a site of conflict. 44 Still,
the banco adjudication process remains a model for binational
compromise, though it has not necessarily benefited all border
stakeholders equally.

41. Beth Simmons, Capacity, Commitment, and Compliance: International Institutions
and Territorial Disputes, 46 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 829, 847 (2002).
42. ALICIA M. DEWEY, PESOS AND DOLLARS: ENTREPRENEURS IN THE TEXAS-MEXICO
BORDERLANDS, 1880–1940, at 239 (2014).
43. BRIAN J. MCNELY, La Frontera and El Chamizal: Liminality, Territoriality, and
Visual Discourse, in THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF RHETORIC (Michelle Smith & Barbara Warnick
eds., 2010).
44. Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017) (per curiam).
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FIGURE 2. PRESIDENT AND MRS. JOHNSON VIEW THE NEWLY
CHANNELIZED RIO GRANDE SECTION AT THE CHAMIZAL. ASSOCIATED
PRESS, DEC. 13, 1968. REPRINTED IN HERNANDEZ V. MESA, 137 S.CT.
2003 (2017) (BREYER, J., DISSENTING).

